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Children and Young People as Moral and 
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Conducted in Northern Italy
Roberta Bosisio¹
13.1 Children as moral actors
Children and childhood were studied for a long time in relation to other subjects and 
other conceptual fi elds, such as theories of education, sociology of family and sociali-
zation.² Th is approach arose from the traditional concept of socialization, according 
to which children are social becomings and not social beings. For this reason chil-
dren were not autonomous actors and they were not considered in the present tense as 
children, but as what they would become: adults.
Today, on the contrary, sociologists consider children to be individuals that partic-
ipate in social life, starting with their specifi c perspective on the world, and accord-
ing to models of action that may diff er from those of adults.³ Th ey are no longer seen 
as passive recipients of the teachings of adults, but rather as actors who play an active 
role in their own development. Th erefore, children, together with adults, participate 
in the construction of the social world that surrounds them, of childhood itself and 
of the interpretative reproduction of their shared culture.⁴
¹ Roberta Bosisio is PhD in Sociology of Law, she worked as research fellow in Sociology of Law at 
the University of Milan (Italy) where she cooperates with the Department of Social and Political Studies. 
Her main fi elds of study and research regard sociology of childhood and children’s rights. She is inter-
ested in studying young people’s lives from their point of views and voices.
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According to the new sociology of childhood, children also possess moral rea-
soning skills. As a matter of fact, it is noticeable that children, starting from their 
early years, are continuously faced with issues of justice and fairness in their everyday 
interactions, as well as with decision-making situations that carry moral implica-
tions.⁵ For this reason, according to scholars, from a very early age they develop a 
good practical knowledge of moral concepts. However, adults usually do not recog-
nize children as moral actors.⁶
Th e results of many studies show children’s competence in terms of moral rea-
soning and action, and also their awareness of the discrepancy between their moral 
competence and the low moral status attributed to them by adults.⁷ Th ese fi ndings 
confi rm that teenagers internalize a developmental model of moral growth and that 
the low social position attributed by adults to them also infl uences children’s self-
image.⁸
13.2 Survey fi ndings
We will present some examples drawn from the fi ndings of three studies⁹ on norma-
tive and legal socialization, which show that young people possess high moral and 
legal reasoning skills.
Th e fi rst one was carried out in 2001–2002 among students attending the last 
year of lower secondary school in four schools in Milan and in two schools in two 
small towns in the north-west of Italy. One hundred and twenty interviews were con-
ducted with the aim of ascertaining children’s knowledge of the 1989 International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, collecting their opinions and perceptions on 
the rights granted, and gathering their normative social representations of the very 
concept of right. Many questions contained in the interview concerned rights per-
taining to various spheres, where children’s rights clash with those of adults: a) very 
personal rights, b) rights relating to everyday life situations, c) rights  concerning more 
⁵ William Damon, ‘Th e Development of Justice and Self-interest during Childhood’, in Melvin J. 
Lerner, Sally C. Lerner, Th e Justice Motive in Social Behavior. Adapting to Times of Scarcity and Change 
(New York, 1981), 57.
⁶ Gary Matthews, Th e Philosophy of Childhood (Cambridge, 1994); Berry Mayall, Towards a Sociology 
for Childhood. Th inking from Children’s Lives (Maidenhead, 2002); Berry Mayall, ‘Lo status morale 
dell’infanzia: appunti dalla Gran Bretagna’, in Heinz Hengst, Helga Zehier (eds.), Per una sociologia 
dell’ infanzia (Milano, 2004), 124.
⁷ Berry Mayall, ‘Lo status morale dell’infanzia: appunti dalla Gran Bretagna’, in Heinz Hengst, 
Helga Zehier (eds.), Per una sociologia dell’ infanzia (Milano, 2004), 124.
⁸ Leena Alanen, ‘Women’s Studies/Childhood Studies. Parallels, Links and Perspectives’, in Jan 
Mason, Toby Fattore (eds.), Children Taken Seriously. In Th eory, Policy and Practice (London, 2005); 
31; Janet Holland, Rachel Th omson, Sheila Henderson, Sheena McGrellis, Sue Sharpe, ‘Catching on, 
Wising up and Learning from your Mistakes: Young People’s Accounts of Moral Development’ (2000) 8 
Th e International Journal of Children’s Rights 271; Allison James, ‘Life Times: Children’s Perspectives on 
Age, Agency and Memory across the Life Course’, in Jens Qvortrup (ed.), Studies in Modern Childhood: 
Society, Agency, Culture (New York, 2005), 248; Jens Qvortrup, ‘Varieties of Childhood’, in Id. (ed.), 
Studies in Modern Childhood: Society, Agency, Culture (New York, 2005), 1.
⁹ Th e three studies mentioned in this work are part of the following national research programmes: 
Citizenship Rights of children, Participation and Control (reference n. 9914638391_004, year 1999); 
Culture, Rights and Normative Socialization of Children and Adolescents (reference n. 200314797_003, 
year 2003); Mediation in Intercultural Practices, in Managing Confl icts, and in Social Promotion (reference 
n. 2005145944_003, year 2005).
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diffi  cult decisions, such as children’s right to be listened to if their parents decided to 
separate.
Th e second research was a study of perceptions of justice among teenagers, con-
ducted in 2003–2004 in two towns in the north of Italy. It involved young people 
attending the fi rst two classes of four diff erent higher secondary schools with the aim 
of examining their representations of issues of justice. A total of 29 teenagers were 
interviewed individually, while 42 were involved in focus groups.
Th e interviews were conducted through the presentation of scenarios based on 
questions of justice. Girls and boys were presented with questions that ranged from 
simpler issues concerning respondents’ everyday lives (decisions occurring in the 
family or among friends), to situations that were not part of their everyday experience 
and that interviewees were less familiar with (administrative and political decisions, 
issues concerning human rights violations). Th e focus groups were presented with a 
variety of moral dilemmas and the respondents were asked to have joint discussions 
on them.
Finally, the third study, conducted in 2007, analysed cultural mediation prac-
tices with separated children living in residential homes. Th is research, among other 
things, aimed at understanding whether the foreign children hosted in those centres 
were aware of living within multiple normative and legal orders¹⁰ and whether they 
had ever come across those confl icts that scholars dealing with mediation, namely 
cultural mediation, call ‘normative confl icts’, which occur when individuals have to 
live with diff erent and often contradictory normative and legal systems. Th is study 
was carried out by means of in-depth interviews with 13 separated boys who had 
been living in reception centres in the north of Italy for at least one year. Th ey came 
from diff erent countries of strong migratory pressure and were aged between 12 and 
18.¹¹ Th eir socialization and integration process had been underway for a relatively 
long time, under the guidance of social pedagogues and cultural mediators. Research 
fi ndings focused on separated children’s representations of their needs, interests and 
fundamental rights, as well as the social and legal rules governing their relations with 
role model adults in their country of origin and in Italy.
13.2.1  Children’s rights to be heard in proceedings concerning 
parental separation and divorce
With respect to the fi rst study, children’s analytical and moral reasoning skills are 
interestingly exemplifi ed by the answers they gave about their right to be consulted if 
their parents decided to separate and their right to express their opinion about their 
custody.
Th e interviewees were asked if they should have the right to tell the judge which of 
their parents they would like to live with if they separate. Th e question was the fol-
lowing: Chiara’s parents are separating; do you think Chiara should have the right to tell 
the judge which of her parents she would like to live with?
Almost all the respondents, except for fi ve boys and three girls, claimed the right to 
be heard. Th eir arguments showed their awareness of the complexity of the situation. 
Most of them are fully aware that such choice would heavily aff ect their future life:
¹⁰ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Estado, derecho y luchas sociales (Bogotà, 1991).
¹¹ More precisely: six Moroccans, three Albanians, two Romanians, one Cameroonian and one 
Pakistani.
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She will be the one who’ll have to live with her mother or with her father, so if she prefers one 
of them she should rightfully say so.
and, at the same time, of the fact that expressing a preference was often taken by the 
discarded parent as a demonstration of lesser aff ection:
Maybe she’s afraid of losing . . . of disappointing the other parent
with the risk that
the parent who is not chosen feels ‘rejected’ and might feel disappointed.
A girl, whose parents had been separated for fi ve years, described her experience not-
ing that it was still diffi  cult for her to take a stand, since one of her parents ‘reasons 
like a child’ and took every choice she made to the advantage of the other parent as a 
lack of aff ection in his regard. She thus commented on this attitude:
Saying ‘I want to stay with this one’ is tantamount to saying that you don’t love the other one. 
( . . . ) I still notice that my father reasons like a child, so if I praise mum he’ll start saying ‘ah, 
you don’t love me then’, I mean, he doesn’t actually say it but he shows it.
Several responses described the embarrassment or the worry involved when having to 
choose one parent over the other:
It is diffi  cult to take a stand because you care for both in the same way and yet you have to 
decide between the two. I would fi nd it embarrassing, because I would probably want to stay 
with my mother, but at the same time I would feel sorry for my father . . . 
Th e account given by a now 13-year-old girl illustrates her awareness of the complex-
ity of these questions very well:
Until you are fourteen, you are not allowed by law to tell who you wish to live with ( . . . ). As 
for me, on the contrary, I knew what I wanted very well, maybe not at seven, when my parents 
separated, but I surely did by the time I was ten. I went to talk to social workers, but I was 
accompanied by my father or my mother, so I could not speak my mind freely. I didn’t say 
what I would have said if I had been alone. I don’t like hurting people. Th e fact that I want to 
live with one parent does not mean that I don’t love the other one ( . . . ). I think that children 
should be able to express their views, though not decide everything; they should just be able to 
voice their opinion because if, on the contrary, I should have to decide, I would feel guilty.
Other respondents, like this girl, recognize the diff erence between the right to express 
their opinions and the right to decide. Th ey showed to be in favour of the right to 
express their opinion in a decision-making process aff ecting them—which the judge 
should take in due account—but, on the contrary, they were against making the 
child responsible for the decision. According to them, the decision should be up to 
the judge, also because he may be aware of some factors that might escape them:
Sure, she must have the right to have her say, but at the end of the day it is up to the judge to 
assess who she’s better off  with.
She has to endure diffi  cult family circumstances; choosing the parent she prefers to live 
with would make it easier for her to go through this situation. However, one would need to 
check whether the parent she chooses is able to look after her, give her an education and keep 
her. One needs to assess whether that’s feasible . . . 
It is interesting to notice that half of the eight children who were against the recog-
nition of the right to express a preference in order to determine their custody had 
experienced their parents’ separation. Th ey account for about one fourth of all the 
respondents with separated or divorced parents. It thus appeared that these children 
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were less disposed to get the child involved in the proceedings concerning their cus-
tody. Th ree boys and a girl, in the light of their experience, reckoned that expressing 
their views in this regard would mean compromising their relationship with the non-
custodial parent. Th ey also did not feel they were ready to make such decision:
I don’t think it would be a good idea, because she would be put against her parents—I know 
this because my parents are divorced too. I will shortly have to see the judge and tell her that 
my father doesn’t help us fi nancially: it is already quite diffi  cult to say that he never helps us, 
let alone if I was to say it in front of him . . . 
I think this is a diffi  cult choice that would only complicate things ( . . . ). If the child has to 
choose one of the parents, whom she loves in the same way, the one who is left out . . . will feel 
disappointed.
Th e other four respondents argued that the child, as opposed to the judge, was not 
able to evaluate the most suitable solution correctly on the grounds of her age:
13.2.2 For justice’s sake
With respect to the second research, which aimed to show adolescents’ moral and 
legal reasoning, below are some fi ndings from one of the focus groups organized in 
the framework of a study focused on young people’s sense of justice.
Th e scenario presented was taken from Michael Kohlhaas, a play written by 
German playwright Heinrich von Kleist in 1810. Von Kleist’s work tells about 
Michael Kohlhaas, a horse dealer who, in order to be allowed to cross the land of a 
local squire, was forced to leave two wonderfully bred horses as security. When he 
returned, he found his horses in a terrible state; he then refused to take them back 
and sued the squire for the damages he had suff ered. Appalled at the judge’s unfa-
vourable ruling and even more at the loss of his own wife, who had been beaten to 
death by a Brandenburg’s guard when she asked for the Governor’s intervention in 
favour of her husband, Michael became the leader of a gang of rebels. In order to 
obtain justice, he made allies with the worst bandits, with whom he turned to loot-
ing and abuse. Since the judges did not behave as they should have done, he had a 
right, even a duty, to take justice into his own hands. Th e trial was re-opened, the 
court ruled in Kohlhaas’s favour, but then he was arrested for his acts of banditry. 
He obtained justice for the damage he had suff ered but, at the same time, he was 
sentenced to death for having threatened the order of the Empire. Finally, Kohlhaas 
died, but justice had been done.
Th e dilemma raised by this story is between the duty to disobey the law when it is 
not right and, on the other hand, the duty to obey it anyway because it is the law. Th is 
can be summed up in one key question: is it right to break a law you deem not right 
because it is contrary to your moral code? Or, on the contrary, should every law, even 
the most unjust, be obeyed because it is the law, in the name of a meta-law, a higher 
principle rooted in the need for political allegiance or social order?¹²
Th e question of obedience/disobedience to an unjust law has always been at the 
centre of philosophical debate, which is fuelled by opposing scholarly views on the 
confl ict between moral and positive law from perspectives mostly related to moral 
and political philosophy and the philosophy of law. To put it very simply: on the one 
hand, there is the belief that every confl ict between moral and positive law should be 
resolved in favour of the former. Th e opposing approach, on the contrary, maintains 
¹² Vincenzo Ferrari, Giustizia e diritti umani. Osservazioni sociologico-giuridiche (Milano, 1995), 101.
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that legality and morality belong to separate spheres; thus, if the confl icts arising 
between them generate some moral dilemmas, these should not interfere with the 
general duty to obey the law. Consequently, all laws must be obeyed, even those that 
are wrong on moral grounds. Nevertheless, at the same time, people have the duty to 
make all lawful eff orts to change these laws. According to this view, therefore, obedi-
ence to the law is a moral duty.
Kohlhaas’s tragedy is in some ways similar to that of Antigone. Von Kleist’s char-
acter, just like the main character of Sophocles’s tragedy, experiences a profound con-
fl ict between two duties grounded in diff erent normative frameworks: on the one 
hand, the legal system and, on the other hand, moral codes. Here too, we are faced 
with non-dilemmas.¹³
Just like Antigone, Michael Kohlhaas stimulated much thought among schol-
ars, who have expressed confl icting views. As Th omas Mann remarked, Michael 
Kohlhaas’s story could raise very mixed feelings among readers. On the one hand, 
it may stir admiration for the determination displayed by the main character, who 
becomes a hero and a defender of justice. On the other hand, however, the crimes he 
committed in his ‘terror-bound frenzy to improve the world’ and seek revenge could 
also cause horror and disgust.¹⁴ In particular, Mann noted that Michael Kohlhaas 
received praise from Rudolf von Jhering who, in his 1872 work Th e struggle for Law 
mentioned von Kleist’s play and wrote enthusiastically about the ideal feeling of jus-
tice held by the main character. For Jhering, standing up for one’s rights is an indi-
vidual’s duty not only towards oneself but also towards society. Goethe, in contrast, 
as Mann remarked, had an opposite view. He defi ned Kohlhaas as an excessive char-
acter and his behaviour as an almost obsessive need to turn a personal matter into an 
issue of general interest.
Michael Kohlhaas’s story also invites another important question. In fact, his fi ght 
for the recognition of the violation of his rights may not only serve to redress the 
injustice he had suff ered, but eventually it could also secure justice for his fellow 
citizens. His struggle would then become of public interest. Th is is exactly the point 
Jhering made. He thought that the violation of a person’s rights amounted to a viola-
tion of ‘the Law’.¹⁵ Within this framework, Kohlhaas is not a man ‘obsessively con-
fi ned in his narrow world of self-interest ( . . . ), but rather a staunch defender of the 
cause of law’¹⁶ and justice, which is considered as a moral value that cannot be seen as 
separate from human dignity. Consequently, defending one’s rights means preserv-
ing one’s moral existence.
Finally, this story begs the question of whether it is fair to sacrifi ce innocent people 
in the name of a higher good, which, in this case, is justice.
Our focus group discussions were started with the question: ‘How do you judge 
the behaviour of the main character of this story? Try to put yourselves in his shoes 
and say what you would have done in his place’.
¹³ Persio Tincani, ‘I dilemmi morali e le scelte tragiche’, in Paola Ronfani (ed.), Non è giusto! Dilemmi 
morali e senso della giustizia nelle rappresentazioni degli adolescenti (Roma, 2007), 43.
¹⁴ Th omas Mann, ‘Heinrich von Kleist e i suoi racconti’, in Id., Nobiltà dello spirito (Milano, 
1997), 119.
¹⁵ Rudolf von Jhering, ‘La lotta per il diritto’[1872], in Roberto Racinaro (ed.), La lotta per il diritto e 
altri saggi (Milano, 1989), 71.
¹⁶ François Chazel, ‘Sentiment d’injustice, lutte pour le droit et rationalité axiologique: variations sur 
le ‘cas’ de Michail Kohlhaas’ (2003) 55 Droit et Société 774.
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Almost all participants thought that Michael Kohlhaas’s behaviour was wrong 
and called him ‘stupid’, ‘naïve’, ‘crazy’, ‘fanatic’, and ‘selfi sh’. Th eir reasons drew on 
family and life values, which should not be sacrifi ced because of an injustice:
Th ere are other values as well as justice, like the family.
It makes you wonder whether it was worth it. I don’t think it was, I wouldn’t sacrifi ce what 
he sacrifi ced: he lost everything in the name of a moral principle. Of course, everybody would 
do it in theory, but if you actually do it in practice you must be mad!
I think he did it all wrong, because, in order to obtain justice, he involved people who had 
nothing to do with it and then he died too. What use was justice to him in the end?
Th ese opinions confi rmed the importance of family in young people’s scale of values. 
Th is is also shown in other studies,¹⁷ where family ranks fi rst.
Some participants, however, agreed with the ideal of justice supported by Kohlhaas, 
although they disapproved of his methods, thus showing their aversion to violence:
I don’t agree with Kohlhaas’s behaviour although maybe, if I put myself in his shoes, over-
whelmed with rage, I would have taken justice into my own hands too. Still, I wouldn’t have 
burned down houses and villages.
I don’t agree because those who had their homes burned down suff ered an injustice too and 
if they had behaved the way he did, it would have gone on forever.
Th e value of non-violence also underlay the criticism expressed by almost all partici-
pants when they were asked if it was legitimate to have a violent reaction when a pub-
lic authority did not acknowledge a violation of legitimate rights and did not provide 
redress for the wrongs suff ered. Placing oneself outside the law and taking justice into 
one’s own hands after suff ering an injustice was tolerated, but never through the use 
of violence:
I don’t think it’s right to use violence but I think it’s right to rebel against injustice.
If we all reacted like that, following our instinct, we wouldn’t be civilized people.
Others added that taking justice into one’s hands should not involve the use of vio-
lence against innocent people:
Th ere is a limit to everything. I mean, I accept the fact that he went and burned Von Tronka’s 
castle to the ground but I do not accept his burning down villages and killing those who lived 
in them.
But some interviewees thought that
taking justice into one’s hands is absolutely wrong because, even if a law is unjust, that’s not 
the way to deal with it.
Th e general opinion was that the use of violence puts the victim at fault, leading to a 
spiralling sequence of abuses which it may become hard to get out of:
Th en you’d become the bully because you’re destroying villages. You’d get down to Von 
Tronka’s level.
Some participants said that it was not worth fi ghting powerful people, even for a just 
cause, because in these cases defeat was in the cards. Th ey thought that in the face of 
a court decision, albeit an unjust one, one should give in if up against very powerful 
people:
¹⁷ Carlo Buzzi, Alessandro Cavalli, Antonio de Lillo (eds.), Rapporto giovani. Sesta indagine 
dell’Istituto IARD sulla condizione giovanile in Italia (Bologna, 2007).
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Surrendering is wrong but unfortunately that’s the way of the world. Th e just will always pay 
the price.
If I’d been in his shoes, after the court had ruled against me, I would have just given up.
Among the few who approved of Kohlhaas’s behaviour, some of them called him 
‘heroic’ and expressed their admiration for him. Th ey pointed out that he had acted 
to defend a principle, the principle of justice, for which he had given up a life of com-
fort, his family and even his own life:
I think that Kohlhaas is to be admired because he had a sense of justice. His behaviour was 
extreme, that’s true, but he pursued his ideal even at the cost of losing his wife and leaving his 
children. I don’t think there would be people ready to do that nowadays.
Michael fought for justice. He lived in the 16th century, when people had to fi ght for jus-
tice. Th at’s why we all have justice now, thanks to these people who fought for a principle.
Several focus group participants, even though they disapproved of Kohlhaas’s 
behaviour, conceded that, if they had been in his shoes, they would have very likely 
behaved in the same way. In this case too, there was a discrepancy between what was 
considered as fair and unfair on an abstract level and, on the other hand, judgements 
expressed on the basis of experience:
I would have done exactly the same thing because suff ering an injustice and not seeing it 
recognized would inevitably make me take justice into my own hands. I wouldn’t accept the 
court’s ruling which, in this case, appeared to be in favour of a powerful family.
Maybe, if I were to put myself in Kohlhaas’s shoes, overwhelmed with rage, I would have 
taken justice into my own hands too. Still, I think that’s absolutely wrong because, even if a 
law is unjust, that’s not the way to deal with it.
Th e last question asked whether Michael Kohlhaas, by reclaiming his rights, only 
received redress for the wrong suff ered or whether, on the contrary, he also secured 
justice for his fellow citizens. A high number of participants, both male and female, 
were convinced that Kohlhaas’s actions would yield positive consequences:
People like Kohlhaas contributed to change the rules and the way we live as people and as a 
society. Nowadays, these things would be a lot worse if those people hadn’t existed.
Th is story certainly made justice less dependent on power. Michael’s rebellion toned down 
the arrogance of those squires.
On the opposite side, some focus group participants did not believe that actions of 
people like Kohlhaas helped fi ght injustice:
I don’t think Kohlhaas’s conduct secured justice for other citizens too, because he eventu-
ally only got justice for himself. Th e court probably couldn’t take it anymore, von Tronka 
was fed up with the whole thing and so they gave him what he wanted. However, I don’t 
think that those coming after him would get the same treatment, unless they used the same 
means as him and rebelled like him.
13.2.3 Separated children’s representations of their rights and needs
Th e fi nal examples of young people’s moral reasoning skills are taken from research 
that sets itself apart from our previous studies. Th is is because, in the fi rst place, the 
sample was not made up of Italian boys but it was composed of young people coming 
from countries of high migration pressure. Secondly, the sample belonged to a spe-
cifi c category of underage children: separated children, that is children, for the most 
part teenagers, who migrate to a foreign country by themselves.
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Th is study admittedly has some limitations, due to the size and the particular 
nature of the sample, which was made up of separated children who started their set-
tlement and integration process in residential homes. However, we believe this sur-
vey is particularly revealing as it focuses on the representations of needs and rights, 
which have been scarcely dealt with in previous research on separated children. For 
this reason, we think that this work could provide an interesting contribution to 
the body of research that has developed in Italy and other European countries since 
the 1990s with the aim of identifying the social and age composition of separated 
children as well as the reasons behind their migration choice and their expectations 
for the future.¹⁸ Th ese studies are innovative with regard to the traditional research 
approach, which had focused almost exclusively on the so-called forced migration 
of children and which portrayed migrant children as ‘passive, vulnerable and neces-
sarily exploited’ within the migration process,¹⁹ with no possibilities or ability to 
make autonomous migration choices. Th ese works, on the contrary, focus on the 
fact that separated children are usually grands enfants, not only in terms of age but 
also because almost all of them have reached a high degree of autonomy and sense of 
responsibility.²⁰
In this regard, it should be pointed out that, while in ‘rich countries’ children’s 
transition to adulthood has become increasingly extended, which entails a later 
assumption of adult responsibilities and the postponement of full independence, 
in ‘poor countries’, on the contrary, ‘our’ representation of childhood is hardly ever 
found; in fact, early access to adulthood implies a shorter childhood and no ado-
lescence because poverty forces children to grow up fast and ‘erases their rights’.²¹ 
Moreover, in countries where everyday life is characterized by constant uncertainty 
due to economic and political instability, there is a diff erent perception of risk com-
pared to affl  uent countries: emigration is not considered as more diffi  cult or hazard-
ous than one’s present life or future perspectives in the country of origin. Th erefore, 
when reading and analysing respondents’ narrations, we need to set aside our own 
representation of childhood, which, on the contrary, is more extended and clearly 
separated from adulthood, it is often idealized and, for this reason, it is equated 
exclusively with light-heartedness and carelessness.²² Separated children should be 
approached in a more objective way, giving due consideration to their personal histo-
ries, their individual characteristics and their own specifi c needs.
¹⁸ See Giovanna Campani, Zoran Lapov, Francesco Carchedi, Le esperienze ignorate. Giovani 
migranti tra accoglienza, indiff erenza, ostilità (Milano, 2002); Monia Giovannetti, Minori stranieri in 
movimento: percorsi e pratiche tra integrazione e devianza. Quaderni di Cittàsicure 21 (vol. 2) (Bologna, 
2000); Dario Melossi, Monia Giovannetti, I nuovi sciuscià. Minori stranieri in Italia (Roma, 2002); 
Clara Silva, Giovanna Campani, Crescere errando. Minori immigrati non accompagnati (Milano, 2004); 
Giovanna Campani, Olivia Salimbeni (eds.), La fortezza e i ragazzini. La situazione dei minori stranieri 
in Europa (Milano, 2006).
¹⁹ Caitlin Farrow, ‘A Review of European Research Findings on Children in Migration’, in Save the 
Children, Conference Report. Focus on Children in Migration (2007) (<http://www.savethechildren.net/
separated_children/publications/reports>), 6.
²⁰ See Irene Azzari, Olivia Salimbeni, ‘Il minore straniero non accompagnato. Defi nizioni e legislazi-
one internazionale’, in Giovanna Campani, Olivia Salimbeni (eds.), La fortezza e i ragazzini. La situazi-
one dei minori stranieri in Europa (Milano, 2006), 19.
²¹ Giulia Di Bello, ‘Prefazione’, in Giovanna Campani, Olivia Salimbeni (eds.), La fortezza e i raga-
zzini. La situazione dei minori stranieri in Europa (Milano, 2006), 10; Vittoria Tola, ‘Prefazione’, in 
Giovanna Campani, Zoran Lapov, Francesco Carchedi (eds.), Le esperienze ignorate. Giovani migranti 
tra accoglienza, indiff erenza, ostilità (Milano, 2002), 13.
²² Alan Prout, Allison James (eds.), Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in 
the Sociological Study of Childhood (London, 1990).
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Within the framework of this study, it is interesting to consider some examples of 
the reasoning developed by our young interviewees when they were asked to assess 
the rules regulating access to employment and compulsory education in their coun-
try of origin compared to Italy.
First of all, it should be noted that, in our survey, work was the most frequently 
cited reason for migrating. Our interviewees therefore seemed to consider work as 
their main need. Children migrating on their own, for the most part, aimed at inte-
grating into Italian society through employment.²³ Almost all respondents declared 
they had decided to leave their country to fi nd a way out of poverty and marginaliza-
tion, a situation which, in their mind, could not be changed. Th ey affi  rmed they left 
with a clear plan that had been agreed with their families, sometimes not without a 
struggle, with the aim of fi nding a job that could allow them to support themselves 
and their relatives as soon as possible.
Almost all these young boys, who had grown up before their time compared to 
‘Western’ children, said they attended school irregularly and only for few years, while 
doing odd jobs or in some cases working every day, with or even without their par-
ents’ permission.
Th e interviewees’ words reveal that, in their countries of origin, education is widely 
underrated: it is not regarded as a value in itself, a fundamental right, a means of 
emancipation but, on the contrary, it is often seen as preventing children from seiz-
ing the already scarce unskilled job opportunities that might arise, where no quali-
fi cation is required anyway. In this regard, it is particularly revealing to notice that 
only few interviewees declared they were aware of compulsory education laws in their 
country of origin while some of them ignored the very existence of compulsory edu-
cation. Even those who were actually aware of those regulations declared they had 
often infringed them.
Once they got to Italy and learned that they could not access the labour market 
without having fi nished compulsory schooling, they assigned education an instru-
mental value.
When you were told that you would have gone to live in a residential care home, did you tell them 
what you would have liked to do?
Yes, I’d really like to fi nd a job but then I understood that without a lower secondary school 
qualifi cation I couldn’t work . . . so I’d better fi nish lower secondary school, attend a course 
and look for a job (16 years old, Albanian).
It should be noted, however, that many respondents found it hard to accept the idea 
of postponing their access to the labour market—and, most importantly, postpone 
earning an income—to attend school, thus disappointing their families’ as well as 
their own expectations.
Some respondents claimed their need/right to work, affi  rming that education 
was a right they would forgo in favour of their need/duty to support their family. In 
those cases, the interviewees’ current situation led to a rupture between what could 
be defi ned as an ‘abstract right’ (education) and, on the other hand, what was claimed 
as a ‘concrete right’ (work). In other words, there was a separation between what these 
young migrants thought the rights of people their age should be in theory and, on 
the contrary, what they reported as their concrete needs, on the basis of their social, 
²³ Joseph Moyersoen, ‘I minori stranieri non accompagnati’, in Ermenegildo Ciccotti, Enrico 
Moretti, Roberto Ricciotti (eds.), I numeri italiani. Infanzia e adolescenza in cifre—Edizione 2007 
(Firenze, 2007), 89.
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economic and cultural background in their country of origin. Th is rupture could also 
be ascribed to the strong sense of responsibility these children felt towards their fam-
ily: they didn’t want to disappoint them nor did they want to fail their expectations.
In Albania, is it normal for young people your age to work?
I think it would be better to go to school, but . . . in Albania, many children don’t go to 
school, they’d rather work. When I was there, poor children started working even before the 
age of eleven. Now, though, I’m told that young children don’t take to the streets to work any-
more because nobody would hire them. I’m sorry to hear that, because their families need the 
money (16 years old, Albanian).
It is interesting to note that although some of them thought that it was right for 
Italian law to allow employment only to children over compulsory school age, at 
the same time, they were convinced that these provisions should not be introduced 
in their countries of origin because they would have negative repercussions on the 
already diffi  cult fi nancial situation of several families.
Under Italian law, children under 15 years of age are not allowed to work. Do you think that’s 
right?
Yes, it is in Italy. In my country, on the contrary, it wouldn’t be right because there you need 
to work at an earlier age and support your family (17 years old, Moroccan).
13.3 Some fi nal comments
On the whole, the examples illustrated here show that young people possess the rea-
soning skills to face even complex questions with regard to situations aff ecting their 
everyday life, as well as more complex situations that are far from their experience. 
Th e sample showed high competencies and a good ability to use diff erent justice and 
moral criteria as well as a strong and realistic sense of the complexity of diff erent 
moral situations.
Boys and girls who participated in our interviews and focus groups displayed a 
considerable ability to draw on a vast array of rules and moral principles and also 
normative and legal systems, which they chose in a selective and complementary way 
according to each given situation.
Especially in focus group discussion, both boys and girls were able to reason and 
discuss the complex questions presented to them, displaying a good practical knowl-
edge of moral concepts. Moreover, participants seemed to realize that they were con-
fronted with dilemmatic situations and they appeared to be aware that it would have 
been diffi  cult, if not impossible, to fi nd a satisfactory and fair solution in all levels of 
judgement: every choice inevitably carries positive and negative consequences, which 
one needs to take responsibility for.
In particular, they were clearly aware of the existence of two diff erent types of 
judgement: the legal and the moral. On several occasions, as mentioned above, they 
pointed out that what was ‘legally right’ could not always be considered as ‘mor-
ally right’; it was also observed that, in a moral perspective—where specifi c values 
and criteria such as loyalty, trust, kinship, and friendship come into play—diff erent 
situations would be considered in diff erent ways, whereas, on the contrary, the law 
should deal with them all in the same way.
In the survey with separated children, respondents showed they were aware of 
the complexity of their situation; they also appeared to be able to form diff erent 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN
13_MichaelFrreeman_Chap13.indd   200 12/1/2011   7:56:55 PM
Children and Young People as Moral and Legal Actors 201
judgements about laws, needs and rights depending on the context and specifi c situ-
ation. In particular, it was noticed that they were aware of the gap between what the 
host society expected of them and viewed as a need for them and, on the other hand, 
what they expected of society and what they thought they needed. Finally, thanks to 
them, it was also possible to establish that there is often a separation between what 
respondents reckon the needs of people their age should be on an abstract level and, on 
the other hand, the actual needs they reported they had in their everyday life, on the 
basis of their past experience, their culture and the context they lived in. Indeed, the 
variables relating to the interviewees’ ‘culture of origin’ and the ‘culture of their coun-
try of settlement’ played a key role in shaping their opinions when they were asked to 
move away from abstract reasoning and express context-specifi c judgements.
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